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Introduction 
A better understanding of upcoming technolog-
ical transformations and their impact on critical 
infrastructure systems and security of supply is 
one of the main drivers of our research. The 
transformation of the classical power system 
into a smart decentralized power system is one 
of the most prominent and societally relevant 
examples of such transformations - the ongo-
ing increase of automation and power con-
sumption illustrates it’s increasing importance 
accompanied by a simultaneously increase of 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, a drastic change 
of power consumption, e.g. by an increased 
usage of electric vehicles, may result in unfore-
seen loads that cannot be managed by the util-
ity provider e.g. in terms of demand side man-
agement. Therefore, our research deals with 
the following topics: Assessing the impact of 
different power and ICT- network structures on 
the resilience of urban systems. Development 
of new risk-based power distribution mecha-
nisms dealing with power scarcity in order to 
avoid large-scale blackouts and improve secu-
rity of supply (Ottenburger et al. 2018b; Otten-
burger und Münzberg T. 2017). The methods 
that are used ground on modelling various crit-
ical infrastructures, power-, and ICT-infrastruc-
tures separately, but also new resilience 
measures. The key idea is to consider smart 
grid topology and power distribution mecha-
nisms as model parameters. Thus, by varying 
these parameters for a specific region, e.g. an 
urban area, good structures and distribution 
mechanisms may be identified. 
 
Urban Resilience and Power System 
The concept of urban resilience encompasses 
various types of resilience dimensions such as 
the social, economic or physical infrastructure 
dimension (Cimellaro 2016). Critical infrastruc-
ture (CI) services such as the supply of elec-
tricity, drinking water, and health care provide 
vital services for the population, thus disrup-
tions or failures of these services are hazard-
ous and can lead to injuries or even losses of 
life, property damages, social and economic 
disruptions or environmental degradations. 
Therefore, CIs constitute a pivotal aspect in ur-
ban resilience considerations and establishing 
and implementing sophisticated continuity 
management concepts w.r.t. CIs can be re-
garded as one of the major building blocks for 
preserving or enhancing urban resilience. Most 
of the CIs like water supply, hospitals, pharma-
cies, and traffic- and transport systems rely on 
electricity - the circumstance of massive de-
pendencies of other CIs to the electrical power 
entitles the electrical power grid to be consid-
ered as a high ranked CI. The generation and 
supply of electricity is currently about to un-
dergo a fundamental transition (Farhangi 
2010; Gungor et al. 2013). Due to the integra-
tion of smart meters, the consumers in the 
classical sense will have the eligibility to con-
sume, produce and distribute electricity. The 
therefor necessary smart meters are electronic 
devices that monitor electricity consumptions 
and generations and allow two-way communi-
cations with other meters (Parhizi et al. 2015). 
However, to keep a stable electricity supply it 
is important that in-feed and consumption form 
an equilibrium. A smart grid construed as a 
complex and highly automated power distribu-
tion grid fundamentally relies on a rigorous 
multi-layered distribution management system 
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in order to maintain grid performance and reli-
ability. The architecture of a distribution man-
agement system allows a partitioning into sev-
eral locally arranged and interconnected 
operation centers which themselves may be 
considered as local distribution management 
systems. A precise and secure operation of an 
energy management system of a smart grid, 
that operates - due to grid stability issues - au-
tomatically in real-time, heavily depends on the 
degree of accuracy of the transmitted quanti-
ties of interest.  
For reasons of simplicity, in the remainder of 
this report infrastructures like companies, com-
mercial buildings or households are included in 
the term CI. 
 
Fig. 1 Interdependent Critical Infrastructures 
 
Vulnerabilities and Challenges of 
Future Power Systems 
Many components of a smart grid are located 
not on the utility’s premise and are therefore 
prone to physical damage. Since information 
technology systems are relatively short lived it 
is quite likely that outdated devices are still in 
service e.g. anti-virus software may be depre-
cated or hardware components may not com-
ply with the latest requirements. Furthermore, 
the great number of devices are potential entry 
points for malicious cyber-attacks like malware 
spreading which may infect smart meters or 
other devices and can add or replace functions 
and disseminates, injecting false information 
by faking sensitive smart meter that can cause 
wrong decisions, and Denial-of-Service at-
tacks by manipulating IP protocols that can de-
lay, block or corrupt the transmission of infor-
mation in order to make SG resources 
unavailable (Aloul et al. 2012). 
Besides the increase of susceptibility on the 
cyber-physical component level, and despite 
the current and upcoming advancements and 
progresses in cyber security technologies, the 
vulnerability of the future power system itself 
and hence the probability of CI systems suffer-
ing from power outage grow, if there won’t exist 
appropriate power continuity management 
strategies w.r.t. CIs. Another issue that should 
not be underestimated are drastic increases in 
power consumption that cannot be handled by 
demand side management techniques solely, 
e.g. e-vehicles and charging behavior. 
Our research is pursuing the following objec-
tive: Developing new approaches to operation-
alize risk-based concepts to foster the devel-
opments of new strategies for CI protection by 
exploiting topological design options for smart 
grids and by proposing a risk-based smart grid 
control mechanism that is embedded in an en-
ergy management system. 
 
Criticality and Degrees of Freedom 
In view of net neutrality, this work perceives 
criticality as a risk-comparing framework, 
which we split up into different subcategories. 
The type of the power shortage scenario, the 
different relevancies of CIs and the timely var-
ying demands for critical services determine 
the possibly timely varying so-called global crit-
icality of CIs in an urban area. Global criticality 
of a CI can be considered as a function de-
pending on relevancies of all other CIs, global 
system variables and the CI’s local criticality, 
where local criticality is a function describing 
the critical state of a CI, reflecting its internal 
state, current and expected demand, current 
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and expected fulfillment of demand etc. Global 
criticality and local criticality are of course 
power shortage scenario dependent. In the 
case of normal performance states of CIs and 
no occurring or expected power shortage, 
global criticality reflects the different relevan-
cies of CIs compared to each other - these val-
ues are called initial criticality of CIs - for more 
details we refer to (Ottenburger et al. 2018b; 
Münzberg und Ottenburger 2018). 
Operationalizing criticality should start in the 
phase of designing grid extensions or develop-
ments both from the ICT- but also from the 
physical power infrastructure perspective. This 
work especially focuses on two topological de-
grees of freedom in the design of smart grids. 
One topological degree of freedom refers to 
decomposition of a smart grid into so-called 
microgrids which may be disconnected from 
the overall smart grid and operate autono-
mously in island mode. A smart grid subdivided 
into microgrids has the potential to restrict cas-
cading effects and hence to be less vulnerable 
against disruptions. Cascading effects due to 
dysfunctionalities of certain components or 
propagation of malware throughout a smart 
grid might be prevented by disconnecting the 
affected microgrids from the overall smart grid. 
Although having isolated disturbed or dysfunc-
tional microgrids from the smart grid of a city, 
CI dependencies may cause issues in other 
parts and reduce the resilience of the city as a 
whole. Another topological degree of freedom 
refers to different configuration options w.r.t. 
smart grid components, e.g. overlaying net-
work structures to provide redundancies within 
a microgrid.   
Obviously, the network topology of a smart grid 
has significant effects on urban resilience par-
ticularly referring to the adequate provision of 
vital services of CIs. Taking initial criticality into 
account during the smart grid design phase 
can be regarded as a first proactive measure 
in the sense of preparedness. The rationale of 
applying initial criticality could be to distribute 
CIs with high initial criticality on different mi-
crogrids, avoiding a concentration of highly rel-
evant CIs in one microgrid, or to build redun-
dancies for CIs with high initial criticality. An 
elaborated topology of smart grids increases 
urban resilience.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Topological degrees of freedom: decom-




Resilience Measure: Supply Index 
Advanced Metering Infrastructures (AMIs) in-
cluding smart meters allow fine-grained power 
distribution management strategies that go be-
yond the classical strategies like rolling black-
outs. A main task is to develop resilient and fair 
power distribution strategies in times of power 
shortage by exploiting the advantages of an 
AMI and smart meters. Therefore, new resili-
ence metrics, measuring security of supply that 
complement known measures like SAIDI (Sys-
tem Average Interruption Duration Index) are 
developed. 
Smart meter can be considered as an interface 
between a prosumer, e.g. a household, and 
Group: Accident Management Systems 
60 
the outer smart grid structure. An AMI that uti-
lizes advanced smart meter technologies, al-
lowing complex communication with distribu-
tion management system entities, enables a CI 
to transfer its current local criticality into the 
distribution management system. The distribu-
tion management system, being aware of all 
the initial criticality values, the relevancies of all 
other CIs, global system variables etc., is able 
to compute the current global criticality for 
each CI (Ottenburger et al. 2018b). In the case 
of a power shortage, caused by dark doldrums 
or cyber-attacks, a system knowledge about a 
global criticality distribution can be used for 
identifying optimal power distribution mecha-
nisms. Therefore, a so-called Supply Index (𝑆𝐼) 
is applied: Let 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 be an infrastructure, and 
𝑐𝑖 ∈ [0,1] the global criticality of 𝑖: 
𝑺𝑰 =  ∑ 𝑐?̃?𝑖∈𝐼 𝑞𝑖(𝑆𝑃𝑖), where  𝑐?̃? =  
𝑐𝑖
∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑗∈𝐼
, is the 
weighted global criticality and 𝑞𝑖 a certain lin-
ear function measuring the quality of supply 
(Ottenburger et al. 2018a). 
The spectrum of optimal power distribution 
mechanisms that are applicable strongly de-
pends on the topology of smart grids or in other 
words smart grid topology determines the 
range of possible optimal power distribution 
techniques and massively influences urban re-
silience. During a power shortage, optimal 
power flows or power distribution policies 
should target at distributing electricity in such a 
way that the severity of the impact of a possible 
decrease of the overall performance of all CIs 
in an urban area is minimum. In enhanced 
power distribution policies, where global criti-
cality is applied, rolling black outs in terms of 
dynamically connecting different microgrids 
with each other, might also be an option. 
 
Results           
The Smart Grid Resilience Framework 
In an ongoing interdisciplinary research project 
(Raskob et al. 2015) UNF is collaborating with 
the Institute for Program Structures and Data 
Organization (IPD), the Institute for Industrial 
Production (IIP) and the Institute for Automa-
tion and Applied Informatics (IAI). The aim of 
this project is to develop a framework for sim-
ulating CIs against certain disruption scenarios 
and to perform systemic resilience assess-
ments of regions of urban scale by mainly fo-
cusing on power shortage scenarios. Power 
scarcity may result from severe weather 
events, cyber-attacks, exceptional dark dol-
drums, or extreme loads.  
A main feature of this framework is to use net-
work topologies and power flow algorithms as 
model parameters that can be varied. The 
framework has a modularized structure: There 
is a power module, an ICT-module, and a CI-
module, that simulates various CIs from the 
health sector and the water supply (Raskob et 
al. 2015; Münzberg T. et al. 2018). 
 
Fig. 3 Modular Structure of the Smart Grid Resil-
ience Framework 
 
In each of these modules, different disrup-
tions/damages of infrastructures can be mod-
elled separately and adjusted within a generic 
disruption framework. By applying the 𝑆𝐼, the 
resilience of physical and ICT-network struc-
tures and power distribution strategies can be 
assessed. The nature of this framework is 
Group: Accident Management Systems 
61 
quite generic and could principally be applied 
to any urban area. Currently, the medium volt-
age distribution grid of Karlsruhe is modelled 
as the base physical power infrastructures 
upon which grid extensions models, as possi-
ble future scenarios, are further developed. 
 
Optimal Power Flow applying 𝑺𝑰 and 
evolutionary Algorithms 
As mentioned in the previous section, the 
Smart Grid Resilience Framework uses net-
work topologies and power flow algorithms as 
model parameters that can be varied. First 
concepts on resilient power flow mechanisms 
were developed: 
An infrastructure 𝑖 may possess process flexi-
bility or coping capacities that allow to specify 
a power demand flexibility interval 
[𝑃𝐷,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑖 , 𝑃𝐷,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖 ],   where 𝑃𝐷,𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖  is the power de-
mand for normal process mode and 𝑃𝐷,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑖  the 
power demand for at least running some es-
sential sub-processes. There might be an in-
frastructure 𝑖 that has criticality equal to 1 - in 
this case 𝑖 has no power flexibility and thus de-
mands a certain power value 𝑃𝐷
𝑖 .  
 
Fig. 5 75 % - scenario-hyperplane: power value 
vectors within the truncated power demand 
cube are potential solutions of the resilient opti-
mal power flow 
 
In the case of power shortage, e.g. only 75% 
of the normal power demand of all infrastruc-
tures is available, new resilient power distribu-
tion strategies in the energy management sys-
tem of a smart grid are thinkable in order to 
avoid total blackouts - nevertheless, new distri-
bution algorithms should not violate non-dis-
crimination. 
Before applying these new concepts on our 
distribution grid model of Karlsruhe, they are 
 
Fig. 4  First results of criticality based optimal power flows on the IEEE33 bus system for stationary 
load states 
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validated against simpler grid models e.g. 
standard IEEE-models:  
For stationary load states optimal power flows 
on the IEEE33 bus system were calculated in 
a joint project with IAI - genetic algorithms were 
applied, in order to maximize 𝑆𝐼 while respect-
ing fair distribution (Ottenburger et al. 2018a). 
Conclusively, the way we applied genetic algo-
rithms can be considered as a possibility to 
specify the corresponding parameter in the 
Smart Grid Resilience Framework. 
 
Summary 
The ongoing transition of the power distribution 
system towards Smart Grids bears the chance 
to conceptually integrate principles of crisis 
prevention and management into power con-
trol mechanisms. Following this aspiration 
global criticality considered as a dynamic fea-
ture of CIs is a promising attribute that helps to 
bridge Smart Grids resilience and urban resili-
ence in a sensible way. In cases of power 
shortages, where first, secondary, and tertiary 
controls are not able to stabilize the whole grid, 
global criticality as a further criterion can be ap-
plied for controlling the power flow in a Smart 
Grid in an urban resilient way and thus contrib-
ute to enhancing urban Continuity Manage-
ment (CM).    
The proposed simulation framework, allowing 
the variation of parameters like Smart Grid to-
pology and power distribution mechanisms, 
can be applied to specific urban systems. Sim-
ulation studies against power disruption sce-
narios that are considered to be plausible for 
that particular urban system can be conducted. 
The outcomes of these studies would be  
 an analytical view on Smart Grid infrastruc-
ture planning in terms of a selection of ur-
ban resilient Smart Grid design options 
and 
 appropriate power distribution strategies 
or algorithms to deal with power shortage 
scenarios; these strategies or algorithms 
could be implemented in the Energy Man-
agement System (EMS) of a Smart Grid.  
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